Hegelian Metaphilosophy: A discussion on the implications of Absolute Truth

Since ancient Greek philosophy the dialectical method, popularised by Plato and further adopted by medieval and modern philosophers alike, including Aristotle, Hegel and Marx, has been utilised as a process to either verify or falsify a priori theses. Yet, in a departure from the Socratic Method, Hegel asserted that contradictions and points of difference are vital in the reconciliation of aporia. Through a unification of both ideas and tensions, Hegel claims his absolute idealist conception of philosophy is able to move beyond relativistic views and subjective weltanschauungs to arrive at a final Truth. Furthermore, by adopting a ‘teleological account of history’ and a dynamic ‘coming-to-be’ of human thought, Hegel essentially shifts the goalposts of his predecessors, asserting that philosophy ought, and as such can, arrive with certainty at one single universal that underpins Being. In this essay I will analyse the Hegelian corpus regarding metaphilosophical claims to garner whether such conceptions are tenable. This will be conducted first through an assessment of the methodology of the Hegelian dialectic, with focus on both the philosopher’s theory of Truth and the centrality of historicism.

Prior to doing this, however, I believe it important to note this paper will concentrate primarily on a post-Kantian view of Hegel[1] due to issues of scope that limit the analysis of theologian terminology.

Positing that “philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality,”[2] albeit without any foundation to how this inference was made, Hegel assumes the position philosophy ought to drive towards is convergent Knowledge[3]. Arguing that philosophies of the past yield only “acceptance or rejection”[4] from a system that postulates theses and antitheses, Hegel believed we mischaracterised points of difference as ‘contradictions’, creating inarticulate misapprehensions that halt our progress towards holistic understanding.

This theory becomes most visible in Hegel’s use of the Bildung metaphor of growth, with the development of a flower between the stages of bud, blossom and fruit. Stating the “blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant,”[5] Hegel suggests, that if we were to base our knowledge of a plant on the blossom alone, we would consequently inherit ‘negative insight’ and a partial, atomistic grasp of what a plant is; creating understanding that is deficit and incomplete. Moreover, rendering this moment as a philosophical ‘dead end,’ we fail in generating new conditions or concepts, halting the progress towards an objective Truth.

It is of no wonder then why Hegel criticised philosophers as generating errors and one-sided theories owing to their inability to transcend attachment to space and time. According to Hegel, within empiricism the ‘aims and results’ are substituted not for the “beginning of cognition” but for “actual cognition” itself and as such “the real issue” is evaded.[6]

The reconciliation of this conflict between bud, blossom and fruit, would see an integration of all reciprocally necessary “moments of organic unity”[7] to form a concrete whole; a totality of experience of the plant. Accordingly, the philosopher is placed somewhere between idealism and historicism. Witness to the course of history progressively ‘unfolding,’ much like the bud to the fruit, the philosopher is responsible for realising truth not as an isolated hypothesis or resultant theory but within the context of space and time, resolving past barricades towards Absolute Truth.

This process, most importantly, reworks the ancient dialectic to include a triadic third stage post -thesis, and -antithesis, commonly references as ‘synthesis’. Beginning with unreflected general principles, a system of deductive reasoning is employed so to ascertain the comprehensive, coherent conception traversing space or time Hegel assures we can reach. There has been much effort here by recent scholars to rescue the philosopher from a simplified reading of his posited dialectic, as the term ‘synthesis’ hardly encapsulates the complexity of Hegel’s logic. Whilst sometimes referenced as ‘sublation,’ the third triadic form is best understood per the original term ‘aufheben’. Literally translated as either “to cancel”, “to keep” or “to pick up”[8], we can begin to reify how concerns about subjective truths are considered.

Whilst we may experience subjective intuitions or conditioned realities, these are but particular truths, “from different perspectives,”[9] that should “not remain in the recesses of what is inner”[10] but come forth to contribute to the Whole. What philosophy ought to deal with then, as suggested earlier, is general principles and later, conceptions that lead us to an objective summary of ‘the real issue.’ Stating “the True is the whole,”[11] much like aufheben conserving the discourse between the thesis and antithesis, the Truth can maintain particular subjective experiences, and preserve the essential content that has come before. As such, contradictions are the catalyst for reconciliation and transcendence, elevating and ‘lifting up’ our original theses by arriving at das absolute Wissen.  

It is of importance here to understand that Truth, of which Hegel asserts is the aim of philosophical inquiry, is the static, stable, and non-relativistic Absolute underpinning all reality; the sum cause and effect of all Being. Potentially bridging the metaphysical debate between subject and substance; subject and object, for Hegel, Being-in-itself and for-other are intrinsically identical. Unlike his predecessor Kant, Hegel claims the idea of the thing-in-itself does not exist, supporting instead a monistic ontology, suggesting “for there all is one.”[12] If the ‘way the world is’ is equal to the way the ‘world is for beings,’ it could follow that Hegel reinstates our access to knowledge-of-the-world by removing Kant’s ultimately unreachable 'Ding an sich.'[13] Is then philosophy an open domain which laypersons can help advance?

In short: no. Resurrecting a similar hierarchy to Plato’s Philosopher Kings, Hegel believes that only the philosopher is capable of transcending “the common road… taken in casual dress,”[14]  to realise the inter-connectedness and convergence of content. Advocating that “the true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system,”[15] for Hegel the philosopher “ideas are only deserving of the ‘name of ‘truth’ when philosophy has had a hand in its production.”[16] She progresses the ultimate conclusion of Being through a scientific exposition and Hegelian Dialectic, accounting for errors in past philosophies to generate new comprehensive conceptions of the world. Essentially a mixture of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, she blends both ‘judgement and comprehension’ to reach a Whole, with results understood through “combining the result together with the process through which it came about.”[17] Resultantly, the philosopher takes on the role of syndicate; quasi-scientist, metahistorian, metaphilosopher and metaphysician.

Prior to the discussion of the philosopher’s metaphilosophy, I believe it necessary to contextualise my own place in history as a sympathetic gesture to the Hegelian canon. It can be said that the pervasiveness of the internet and digital information in everyday life of the 21st Century catalysed a paradigm shift that has redefined global thought. More recently, AI[18] algorithmic features of social media platforms and online news feeds aimed at increasing personal experiences has instead supercharged our confirmation biases. Whilst the layperson believes they are thinking ‘globally’, they are potentially becoming more segregated in their modes of thought. As such, it could follow, similar to the views of Hegel, that the contemporary or ‘new philosopher’ is becoming more entrenched within their own one-sidedness, failing to grasp how her individual view fits into the greater countryside of the philosophical system. Living in what one could argue is the wake of Cartesian Dualism, any point of conflict is generally taken to either extremity so to overcompensate for previous errors. This can be witnessed within political, social, ethical and legal philosophy alike.

To utilise the Hegelian conception of philosophy would be to favourably placate the disparity in these polarities of thought to embrace the diversities that exist between such assertions. Yet, whilst the convergence of atomistic ideals seems attractive, I am not entirely convinced it is necessary for philosophy to march towards one Absolute universal. And, furthermore is this even tractable?

Despite stating “the aim by itself is a lifeless universal” [19] I would like to temporarily isolate the Hegelian metaphilosophical aim, stated previously, to elucidate and assess the resulting consequences. First off, to quote his predecessor, Kant, ‘ought implies can,’ and as such, it is optimistically assumed we can arrive at the unification of the Truth of Being. So, I ask, how is it that the particularity of existence can be preserved in this final Idea?

Is not the reason for this dynamic transgression of thought, from conditioned principles to general universals, to achieve rationality and freedom of and for the self-consciousness? Accordingly, it could be argued that unless I can subjectively relate to the purported whole Truth then it becomes of no use to me and has no bearing on my reality. In fact, this quandary is not dissimilar to the claims posited by both Karl Marx and William James in response to the Hegelian dialect arguing philosophy should initiate change, not just deal in representations. As for conclusions to be active or effective there is much more required from philosophy than just the rational assertion that an Idea is correct. I recall the adage, ‘history is written by the victors’ in the suggestion that Hegel has not broached how underrepresented minorities would ever be included in either reflective or philosophical inquiry into the history of thought. With both history and philosophy thus far governed by gender and race schemas[20], I doubt such a task will ever be able to achieve the ‘wholeness’ Hegel speaks of. It is through an examination of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History the Eurocentrism of his thesis becomes apparent, discussing the ‘static nature’ of Indian and Chinese culture. Consequently, not only are such groups neglected in Hegel’s objective history but are themselves moreover not able to achieve freedom through the realisation of this Idea.

So, I ask, is the historical philosopher ever able to remove their own era’s cultural conceptions and prejudices from the reflective reading? And, ought they to? Potentially Hegel’s religious preconceptions led him to ponder questions of theodicy, and hence, desire one all-encompassing Truth? Whilst such a statement is just conjecture, it follows that Hegel himself, especially in his rationale of Eastern culture falls victim to his very own disparagements. However, Hegel himself would surely argue his assertions of the East are but partial truths yet to be realised as a Whole. As such, the question reorientates as, when can we arrive at the Absolute Truth?

Stating, “only in the end is it truly what it is,”[21] one could assume that the totality of human thought and Truth cannot be reached until the end of humanity. Is it not fallacious to assert that Being can be resolved through the Absolute that can only be known through the end of Being? In fact, illustrative language used throughout Phenomenology of Spirit would suggest just this, likening the aim and result; start and finish, to  “lifeless” entities  and “corpse(s)” respectively. Why should philosophy inexorably journey toward a perfect Understanding if we are unable to ever reach such a goal? Furthermore, insisting truth only appears “when its time has come,”[22] and “never prematurely,”[23] it positions any future philosophical inquiry not only as deterministic but creates a latent condition that suggests such work can only be performed retroactively. Consequently, and even without the traditional metaphysical reading of Hegel, he himself creates a one-sided argument that argues against one-sidedness due to the presupposition of the metaphysical existence of God.

Whilst James, much like Hegel aims at a comprehensive perspective, he adopts a subjective and pluralistic view of truth due to his assertion of the “complexity of fact.”[24] Further, his conception of philosophy is but the expression of differing and diverse personal worldviews or weltanschauung. What is ‘true’ within this weltanschauung is merely what is useful or expedient to the individual’s flourishing. Whilst Hegel asserts, “human nature only really exists in an achieved community,”[25] he would refute James’ objections by arguing it is the very fragmentation and compartmentalisation of thought he is moving against. To return to the earlier topic of digital information, which has made obtainable the awareness of the extreme vastness of thought, I tend to agree with James that such a system potentially negates the ‘tangled’, ‘painful’ and ‘dark’[26] aspects of life for the sake of maintaining a “noble, simple and perfect”[27] conception of Being. If Hegel were to assure that Truth was obtainable, and assuredly all-encompassing, within the context of Being, it remains elusive how philosophy could reach such sublation.

In summary, Hegel’s metaphilosophy concerning aspects of his theory of Truth and centrality of history has been found to be fraught with his own prejudices that assume the existence of God. Whilst his positioning of contradictions as catalysts for philosophical inquiry seems to benefit the extremity of thought in the digital age, his aim towards Absolute Truth has not successfully answered how underrepresented minorities and subjective experience can ever be preserved within such an end, and furthermore how the histories of such groups can ever be expounded in an objective Whole.

[1] Rather than the traditional metaphysical reading.

[2] Georg W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans A. V. Miller (Oxford University Press, 1977), 37.

[3] Or rather, ‘True comprehension’, as opposed to unreflective understanding.

[4] Ibid., 38.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel, ( Oxford University Press, 1983), 271.

[9] Ibid., 285.

[10] Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 58.

[11] Ibid., 20.

[12] Ibid.

[13] German: thing-in-itself

[14] Ibid., 43.

[15] Ibid., 38.

[16] Ibid., 57.

[17] Ibid., 38.

[18] Artificial Intelligence

[19] Ibid.

[20]Sally Haslanger, “Changing the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy” Hypathia, 23 (2008): 217.

[21] Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 42.

[22] Ibid., 59.

[23] Ibid.

[24] William James, Some Problems with Philosophy, (Harvard University Press, 1979), 65.

[25] Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 58.

[26] James, Some Problems with Philosophy, 65.

[27] Ibid.