What is Philosophy? Transcendental extension of thought & toward conscious unknowing
One of the aims of philosophy, despite differences in approach or methodology, has long been to arrive at foundational ‘truths’ or ‘givens’ about the universe. Gifted the name philosophia (philo- ‘loving’ and -sophia ‘knowledge’) by the Ancient Greeks, the discipline has been synonymous with the pursuit of knowledge ever since.
Yet, despite efforts, the question of ‘what is philosophy?’ has hardly found resolve. In formulating an answer to this question, boundaries and limitations are set, not just on the descriptive dimension of what philosophy has been or is, but also to what philosophy ought to be. Though, by virtue of design, normative claims also intrinsically suggest a negative element of what philosophy ought not to be. And so, if philosophy avoids certain particulars or conditions, can it really be called philosophy? As, in the formulation of ‘truths,’ if metaphilosophy remains limited, so will the results be partial and narrow. For is not philosophy the willingness to critically explore all perspectives.
Thus, it would follow philosophy intrinsically resists definition.
Despite this, within this essay I will attempt to answer the age-old question, ‘What is Philosophy?’ Firstly, I will argue that philosophy cannot be divorced from either subject or context, in a broader secondary claim that suggests differing species of philosophy are merely results of personally-significant ontological quandaries. Lastly, I propose the essence of philosophy is an extension outward of thought, and the moving toward a conscious unknowing, that provides an experience of transcendence for the philosopher.
Philosophy carries subject and context.
And yet, whilst many philosophers have attempted the very task to define philosophy, despite notorious difficulties, I argue they have merely arrived at their conception of philosophy. In fact, I question the integrity of metaphilosophical claims in the sense that historically, metaphilosophy appears restricted to the cross promotion of one’s own philosophy-proper. As such, instead of analysing what has been said in the past, I aim to find commonalities in the nature, and quality of inquiry.
At the very base level, philosophy is thinking. If I were to theorise it were a way of ‘thinking,’ it would necessarily follow that I would be advocating for a certain methodology (over-and-above another). Indeed, the history of the discipline has been clouded with dispute over the cogency of a priori and a posteriori reasoning and whether empirical verification is imperative, alongside theoretical deduction, to yield genuine knowledge of the world. And yet, whilst Socrates and Hume sit diametrically opposed on this debate, I doubt anyone would theorise either are undeserving of the term philosopher purely due to their methodological asymmetry. Consequently, it is clear philosophy does not have a distinct modus operandi.
In fact, I suggest that variations of philosophical methodology occur purely in relation to their context in space and time. And theoretically, so does the focus of investigation. Could not the metaphysical concerns of Descartes relating to the existence of God be a product of tension, during the Age of Enlightenment, between religion and the sciences? In a similar vein to the work of Hegel, I suggest that if we were to view the work of Descartes divorced from the social, political, and historic context of the time, (that one could argue is responsible for the posited thesis), we would be choosing to read only a partial, incomplete and abstracted account of the philosophy by essentially stripping it of purpose. And if one thing can be agreed upon by all theorists alike, philosophy is not an accidental quest; it is one of intention.
Whilst this intention may be to arrive at objective Truth, the philosophical inquiry itself can never be independent from the subject. And nor should it. Further to this, context and subject cannot be posited independently from one another, as it would be absurd and impossible to think of context without existence.
To use an analogy, albeit quite abstract in formulation, it would be similar to a comparison between synthetic laminate and solid hardwood flooring; whilst both products may appear identical in aesthetics (i.e. end presentation), they have clearly been produced through different manufacturing and engineering means (i.e. context). Therefore, there would be something lost to my understanding if I were to simple render the laminate as ‘timber flooring.’
Philosophy is a positing of thesis true to the philosopher’s world.
Possibly, the very act of trying to resolve questions about the world in which we live suggests that the discipline has an inherent therapeutic function. Common ground is found between differing species of philosophy in that each are attempting to resolve unknowns of our existence. But, why? What is this offering us beyond the acquisition of further knowledge? Whilst James suggests it may offer us correction and resolution of the pseudo-problems philosophy first created, I believe it corrects the pseudo-problems of life (that the subject has created). And as such, amongst its ends, is a tool to cope with the world in which we find ourselves.
Different branches of philosophy are merely disparities in personal quandaries.
‘How ought one to live?’ This is but a discussion for those who have found tension and contradiction within their own moral code. If a subject were to view themselves as ‘good,’ would they not need to find reason to why they then still commit ‘bad’ acts? ‘What is real?’ Is this not a discussion for those interested in resolving how life came about? Philosophy is an asking of questions of life that, whilst may not provide an answer, may render the question no longer necessary. What philosophers sometimes forget within this task, however, is that they are not entirely concerned or committed to the outcome. Philosophy after all, is an act, not a result. It is the process of criticising prima facie reasoning, that will lead to either a confirmation of the original hypothesis, or a challenge to preconceptions and a change in thought. The moralist in the above equation, in study of metaethics, no longer views ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in such a rudimentary, black-and-white manner. Or, maybe they have found solace in deontological ethics of Kant. Or, consequentialism. Potentially they even posit a new thesis.
Either way, the philosopher takes on an active position. The subject is expanding themselves. Consequently, the essence of philosophy becomes a reaching out; an extension.
Yes, there exist different philosophies. Some of these contradict one another. Some focus on generalities, others on particulars. And yet, the discipline allows for this; it begs for it. The very act of philosophising is found in the principle task of distrusting and being sceptical of one’s conditioning of life. For this is the act of weighing prejudice.
We begin with personal philosophies, or what James would call weltanschauung, inclusive of commonsensical propositions or beliefs, folk philosophies, hearsay, or even opinions and traditions of the past. We then, via the critical reflection of ourselves or our peers, begin to question whether such a hypothesis is completely incoherent, incorrect, relative or conclusive. In this process, we both add and subtract. Furthermore, we revise. And then, we revise again.
‘But, wait,’ I hear you say, ‘I thought you said there is no one fixed methodology?’ Correct, there isn’t. However, we are unable to begin with a tabula rasa. It would not only be foolish to expect this, but I cannot even begin to imagine how one would go about this process. Our prejudices are the very reason for the line of inquiry in the first place. For remember, philosophy and subject are intimately comingled. By its very nature, discussed earlier, in that philosophy refuses to be bound by exclusions or limitations, and instead, is willing to go ‘anywhere,’ it must permit the social activity of ‘discourse.’ Philosophers, with inherent difference in subjective and contextual experience evolve philosophies by the addition of perspective. Prejudices become seen in other light, and a more comprehensive account is formed. As such, philosophy is radically social by nature.
So, should these individual philosophies converge? No, in that they do not necessarily have to. But yes, if it is of importance to the philosopher to see harmony, balance and unity within the world (arguably, their world). As suggested earlier, differing philosophies, in approach or focus, are merely resultant from differing personal quandaries. We are unable to intercept divergent temperaments from going toward certain philosophies. If we were, it would be due to the quandary no longer being of concern to the subject.
With a link to both context and subject, it would appear then that not only is historicism an important tenet to the discipline, but there is something fundamentally ontological in respect to philosophical inquiry.
Philosophy as extension
It has been suggested that there is no one fixed definition of philosophy, over and above that ‘philosophy is resistant to definition.’ And yet, we have found that the essence of philosophy is extension. Why is it that some are drawn to philosophy for extension in life over say, spirituality or sports? Could it be similar to the suggestion before that we go toward preferences, in that those drawn to philosophy as a discipline are more head-centred than others? As such, I suggest philosophy is therapy for thinkers.
Philosophy is a moving-beyond, transcendence of thought.
There is no one size fits all. There is no one philosophy. There is only the philosophy and way thereof relative to the subject-context of the philosopher.
I hear the objection, is this stance aphilosophical? In short, no. this conception of philosophy is by no means unconcerned. The very opposite actually. It is merely considerate and compassion towards all philosophies, viewing each as a product of their time and location, and subject-context.
In fact, taking nothing as given and questioning all prejudice, it gifts an extension not only to the philosopher themselves but to others, catalysing future philosopher’s transcendental path, whether for the positive or negative.
It does not necessarily need to arrive at answers. In fact, I suggest historically the discipline has raised as many questions as it has answered. Potentially, more. Furthermore, if we understand philosophy as boundless, surely, we accept the temporal nature of any answers we arrive at. So then, does it follow that there are no Absolute Truths? Potentially, no. However, such an answer is surely proposing a normative claim on the discipline. And so, I rather suggest, potentially an Absolute can only be arrived at under the resolve of the subject-context relation, or in other words, the end of existence. If times’ arrow remains marching forward, subject and context evolve, and as such, so too does philosophy continue to reach out. As furthermore, the task of philosophy is never complete.
Essentially, taken givens at the beginning of the act of thinking are developed within the broader countryside that converses with other known philosophies, as well as the subject-context and space and time responsible for generating the thesis.
As such, the task of philosophy, becomes an acknowledgement of the difficulty of knowing anything for certain and an act of thinking toward a conscious unknowing.
In the present essay, I have argued that the very nature of philosophy is resistant to definition. However, in pursuit of a descriptive claim about the discipline I have been able to expound the essence of philosophy to be one of extension. It is within this extension, philosophy creates a transcendental path for the subject to ask personally-imperative, and context driven questions about the universe. Whether or not an answer is arrived at, albeit either relative or conclusive in nature, the task of thinking allows the subject to critically assess the importance of inquiry in relation to their own life and find solace in either the resolve or refutation of life’s pseudo-problems.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Freiedrich. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford University Press, 1977.
James, William. Some Problems with Philosophy. Harvard University Press, 1979.