Socio-Spatial Disadvantage within Melbourne: An argument against housing as a market commodity

Housing has long been thought a basic need for survival. When discussed in relation to rights, it is believed that without access to adequate shelter, other subsequent fundamental basic rights become compromised, including the right to life, liberty and personal security and the right to an adequate living standard as well as the right to freedom of movement and to participate in the cultural life of community. However, within a capitalist economy housing is treated merely as a commodity to be traded or sold in order to engender wealth.

The present essay has been organised into four components. I will begin first with a discussion on the conception of housing as a good to form a foundation to later discuss the contention of housing traded within the commodity market. I will then discuss Rawlsian ideals of distributive justice; firstly, as it is commonly discussed as the benchmark for egalitarian distribution of goods, but also in regard to the difference principle in an argument that highlights the importance of branching away from theories reliant upon market economics. In the next part of the present study, I briefly attempt to dispel myths of government interventions that support claims of housing affordability and rental support. In the final section I will undertake an analysis of disadvantaged suburbs in the context of Melbourne, Australia with the help of the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, in an attempt to answer, ‘to what extent are market forces responsible for the generation of socio-spatial division?’ Ultimately, it will be argued that housing ought not to be treated as a market commodity if we are to avoid the formation of neighbourhoods of grave disadvantage that subsequently begin to ghettoise Greater Melbourne.

Housing as a right, good or market commodity?

Indeed, housing is the stable foundation from which social life is formed; essentially relied upon as a base where we can operate and sustain education, employment and health as well as the formation of family and retirement.[1] In fact, in 1994 the Australian Government acknowledged that “an adequate standard of living with particular reference to housing”[2] is a human rights issue. And yet, one could hypothesis that such a statement, coming from a federal government, would appear to suggest they are adopting a normative responsibility for providing the object of the claim right, namely, housing, to the individual. Indeed, Welfare State Theory advocates for a targeted intervention by government to provide an appropriate ‘social minimum’ to citizens in order to promote economic and social well-being.[3] For it is true that each citizen of a community establishes their own conception of the good, that includes an arrangement of aims and ends that embody what a person values in life. Whilst it is rather uncontroversial to suggest that each citizen ought to be allowed the right to pursue their conception of the good life, how exactly such theoretical claims translate into practice appears to be an area of high academic contention.

Welfarists would suggest that of primary importance in the distribution of goods is the level of welfare experienced by all people.[4] However, in measuring welfare, or rather, ‘health, happiness, or fortune,’ this argument appears to collapse into similar concerns produced by utilitarian and consequentialist theory, especially regarding how theoretical calculations can traverse into practice. In objection, I believe welfare-based theories would encourage an equitable distribution of goods in considering that economic standing is often resultant from factors of luck. Whether luck is delivered to a person in the form of either bad or good, the question remains, is it moral for the government to ‘balance the scales’ and ensure both fortune and burdens are distributed more equally? However, in order to answer such a question, it is germane to first understand the notion of housing as a good.

The most basic private goods offered to us through housing are shelter, amenity and location.[5] Indeed, housing can be thought of as an excludable and pure private good in that in owning property, we can enact the right to control who does and does not enter the premise. This not only affords privacy, but also safety and security of further private goods stored within. And yet, housing can also be thought of as a personal good in that it can extend, embody or aid in the development of individuals’ personalities. However, in what seems a contrary move, the Government considers housing as a commodity that individuals’ have a right to purchase within the forces of the market economy.

Indeed, much of recent popular debate on housing affordability within the Australian context has centred upon the inability of young potential homeowners from entering the market.[6] However, the response from Government suggests the underlying issue is the disparity between supply and demand, that would see, in assuming median growth, the market reach a deficit nationally of 640,000 dwellings by 2029.[7] Apparently, housing stock has not kept pace with demand due to the factors of: 1) the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) forcing financial institutions to become more stringent in lending practices and availability of credit and 2) increased trends in immigration and population growth.[8] However, absent from common discourse is the idea that in the treatment of ‘housing’ as a market commodity, such an entity will always be subjected to concerns of supply and demand, in that such phenomena are the intrinsic essence of any commodity market. However, in utilising both supply and demand as a method of controlling market forces, it is assumed that all people in need of a house are also in a position of demand. And yet this is clearly not the case. Sally, who is unemployed and at risk of homelessness as she is being ‘kicked-out’ of her parental residence, is definitely in need of a house. However, it does not follow that Sally has a demand for housing, as she is currently not in a position where she can afford such an endeavour. Consequently, the government’s estimate of housing demand falls dramatically short in considering those with a need for housing. However, whether housing is supported as a claim right, good or market commodity, questions of how best to distribute such entities remain. 

How ought we to distribute housing goods?

John Rawls, within his 1971 seminal work, A Theory of Justice, proposes the most explicit and developed theory of distributive justice to date.[9] Within Rawls’ notion of justice as fairness, the concept of housing can be viewed in connection with society’s Basic Structure (BS),[10] or in other words, the foundational legal institutions that have decisive authority over the distribution of primary goods.[11] Within Rawls’ distributive account he advocates for the following principles:[12]

1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all;

2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

Further to this, Rawls would suggest that such a system is working efficiency only when, the arrangement of the basic structure is unable to be redefined so that goods and burdens distributed to one individual cannot be increased in a manner that does not adversely affect another.[13] Whilst such a tenet seems impossible to empirically test, I am more interested in the latter component of the Second Principle, namely, the difference principle. This holds that inequalities experienced in the distribution of goods are permissible under the proviso that such distribution will still benefit the least advantaged members of society.[14] Such a notion, underpinned by the moral campaign to weigh each citizen of society equally, if applied to the distribution of housing, prima facie, would appear to potentially raise the living standards of the bottom quintile[15]. However, in doing so, it also expects the worst-off people in society to accept conditions of inequality justified by such a system, whether or not they necessarily benefit from them.

However, I argue that the very presence of inequality is sufficient in indicating the system of distribution is not working effectively. More importantly, if inequalities are mostly directed towards the least advantaged members of society, social stability can become endangered by an increased vulnerability of such people to subordination or oppression. For if housing is treated purely as a market commodity that can generate financial freedom, that negates and overrides its otherwise unique standing as also both a private and personal good, it can be argued that everyone still has a right to benefit from such a system. And yet, I do not believe that the framework of Rawlsian distribution necessarily allows for such equal opportunity.

As, for Rawls the difference principle is concerned with the absolute position of the least advantaged people of society over and above their relative position.[16] If considering the Australian context, 2016 data suggests that for singles reliant upon either Newstart of Youth Allowance payments, less than 2% of property listings are both affordable and appropriate at a national scale.[17] So, if we were to only increase government payments to these individuals that would allow for a larger subsidy contribution to rental agreements, would the difference principle necessarily be satisfied? In other words, to what degree do the conditions of the worst-off need to increase, before inequality is essentially tolerated?[18] As, if my understanding is correct the principle advocates for a decrease in inequality only up to the point that the absolute position of the least advantaged can no longer be increased. If correct it would appear that such a notion runs counter to the very function of distributive equality; it is not fair to suggest an individual’s concerns of wealth disparity, bias or injustice are only valid if their own wealth falls short of a minimum standard. Additionally, on a more structural level, the idea of inequality can only be understood in relation to multiple entities so that a difference of degree of circumstance can be perceived; for it is a relative term. As such, I argue that the difference principle tenet is fallacious in treatment of the notion of inequality.

For if an individual or group’s absolute position has increased, it does not necessarily follow that their relative position has also. Indeed, wealth distribution within Australia sits on the Gini Index at 62.50,[19] suggesting that the nation experiences wealth inequality at a higher rate than the OECD average,[20] and additionally, that more wealth is controlled by less hands. With over 39% of Australia’s wealth held in owner-occupied housing, of which the lowest quintile has almost no stock[21], with assets limited to vehicles or home contents, the richest 20% of the nation more than quadruples the standings of the lowest 20%.[22] Whilst I do not advocate for strict equality, due to impingements upon individuals’ desert rights, even if the difference principle were to adjust the absolute position of the least advantaged, if wealth disparity was still evident at such a level as just described, distribution could hardly be rendered fair or just.

In fact, Queralt (see: footnote), within his examination of the role of the market within Rawlsian theory, suggests that whilst Rawls does not explicitly endorse a market-based economy, it plays a major role within his envisioned just society.[23] If so, it appears that potentially Rawls did not intend for the difference principle to be applied to individual concerns of equality but to the system as a whole itself.

Indeed, Rawls himself confirms this, suggesting the difference principle is applied by calculating “how well off the least advantaged are under each scheme and then select the scheme under which the least advantaged are better off than they are under any other scheme.”[24] However, if a property-owning market were to yield greater benefits to the worse off than any other alternative, it would seem that Rawls would justify such conditions, and further, advocate for market-based economics. Moreover, what if the proposed system in satisfying the difference principle also inherently generates more inequalities experienced by the more prosperous in society? Such a Robin-Hood Tax system would surely produce not only justified claims of desert, but further, potentially produce more inequality (between all levels of advantage) than an alternative system. In other words, Rawlsian distribution is not concerned with inequality per se, but only inequality reference to the least advantaged, which for me, is rather morally objectionable.

And yet, I strongly believe that under any market conditions, if housing is treated as a commodity, there is bound to be inequality and injustices that are unacceptable (at every level of advantage), but further, are unable to be rectified by purely altering the absolute position of the lowest quintile. Indeed, the remainder of this paper will argue that market forces are responsible for driving socio-spatial patterns, and further housing inequality, in virtue of the very nature of commodity markets.

The issue with housing as a commodity

Marketplace trends, or rather, the supply and demand of goods, is often discussed as operating autonomously and separate from government expenditure. Whilst direct investment from the government at federal level, including the provision of public housing as well as arrangements such as Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) and the National Housing and Homelessness Agreement (NHHA), is commonly discussed as a positive targeted intervention on the market, these disbursements together only accounted for 16.9% of the total housing expenditure for Melbourne during the fiscal year 2011-2012.[25] This spending was unquestionably eclipsed by indirect provisions through the tax system that saw nearly $861 million allocated to negative gearing and over $3.5 billion on capital gain tax exemptions (together accounting for the remainder of the budget).[26]

Firstly, tax exemptions on negative gearing, or rather, those properties that cost more to own and manage than the gross income generated by the investment, appear prima facie as a positive form of financial leverage that can open opportunities for middle-income earners to enter the market. Yet, with almost 1.3 million Australians owning a negatively geared property, it is only the top quintile of investors who see any concentrated benefits of utilising such a system.[27] Furthermore, the notion of negative gearing naturally incentivises investors to move towards the higher echelon of the housing market. Subsequently, there are is less invested at the low end of the market, increasing competition between properties both within rental and home ownership markets.[28]

Secondly, the idea of tax exemptions on capital gains runs parallel to the concept of housing as a commodity. It seems erroneous to suggest that one can not only profit, but be exempt from tax on that profit, if housing has been utilised as a means to generate income. As, for many people, and especially both the roughly 70,000 homeless[29] as well as the 228,000 the National Housing Supply Council (NHSC) registered as in demand of dwellings,[30] during 2011, housing is most definitely an end. In fact, recent research confirms my intuitive judgements that capital gains are distributed unevenly throughout Melbourne[31], with higher gains attributed to mainly inner and middle areas of Melbourne, or i.e. suburbs of more advantage. If we consider these findings alongside negative gearing, it is evident that indirect government spending plays a significant role in the spatial distribution of wealth in a city. And yet, as I will subsequently argue, even if such tax exemptions or interventions are removed, the market itself is also responsible for the generation of socio-spatial inequality.

The socio-spatial inequality of the housing market

Prior to doing this however, it is important to consider that there are two very different kinds of consumers within the housing market; owner-occupiers and tenants.[32] As such, immediately a class system is formed between the division of tenure securement. Whilst I believe that it is possible to argue such tenure-related-division is the keystone issue surrounding housing inequality and the formation of a subordinate underclass, as Wheeler notes it is unfortunately outside the scope of this paper.[33] And yet, I implore you to remember such a notion whilst I discuss impacts upon socio-spatial patterns, as it helps to highlight how inequality is both entrenched and systemic within the market structure.

The reality of our current situation is that more people than ever find themselves within the private rental sector (PRS), which has grown upwards of 38% nationally over the years 2006-2016.[34] In fact, the Andrews government remarked on the increase in the PRS in October of last year when announcing a set of reforms to the Residential Tenancies Act that would see renters gain increased rights during occupation. Coming into effect in Victoria as of July 2020, new amendments to the Act will see a capping of bond, a ban on rental bidding and limits to rental increases as well as raises to basic standards of operation.[35] And yet, such provisions hardly seem to level the playing field between the differing consumers. Rather, it serves purely as evidence that the government acknowledges the inherent inequality within tenure-related-division.

In order to elucidate how market forces perpetuate socio-spatial disadvantage, I will utilise several current studies by the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI), an Australian based independent, not-for-profit research network that is leading the field in the thematic areas of affordable housing and homelessness. Firstly however, I believe it pertinent for the remainder of this paper to expound exactly what is meant when utilising the term ‘disadvantaged area,’ which itself can be understood via three distinct ways:[36]

1. A people-based approach that refers to a concentration of people “experiencing poverty, deprivation or exclusion”;

2. A place-based approach that refers to an area which inherently disadvantages residents from poor access to “employment opportunities, public services and other amenities”;

3. A socially-based approach that refers to an area that has a high rate of social problems “such as “teenage pregnancy, domestic violence or other crime or substance abuse.”

For this paper, I have chosen to adopt a people-based understanding of ‘disadvantaged area’ so that I am able to further link issues across (2) and (3) to being resultant from the market itself. Latest collection of data suggests that during 2006, of 492 suburbs of Melbourne, 50 were identified as ‘disadvantaged,’ of which 90% were located contiguously to the west, north and south east of Melbourne, forming spatial clusters and corridors of concentrated socio-economic background.[37] Indeed, over half of the population of disadvantaged suburbs are born overseas.[38] And, whilst only 10% of suburbs within Greater Melbourne have been recognised as ‘disadvantaged,’ the people housed within such areas represent over 17% of the population, and thus also a great proportion of Australia’s émigré community.[39] 

As AHURI has noted, the inner area of Melbourne has been increasingly gentrified over the past 25 years[40] due to changes of locational preference in the housing market that has developed in effort of the local government trying to combat urban sprawl and associated costs of infrastructure of a growing population.[41] In response, developers created a new typology of building; an infill multi-unit dwelling, that initially provided an affordable housing solution for lower income households, closer to the Central Business District (CBD).[42]

However, since 2001, as AHURI notes, such suburbs, began attracting more investments, especially from first-home owners.[43] Noting growth of population density of such areas (generated by multi-residential infill units), the government responded through improvements to amenities, services and infrastructure that then catalysed further exponential growth of average stock prices. So essentially, what began as a metropolitan planning strategy of government and developers to increase stock of affordable housing, created the very opposite effect, raising prices of both rental and home-owning markets within the areas. 

For example, the city of Boroondara, the amalgamation of the suburbs Kew, Camberwell and Hawthorn, displayed a dramatic increase in house sale prices in relation to Melbourne-wide medians, jumping from 57% above in 1986 to 131% above by 2006.[44] However, such a process by any means is not new; since the 1970s higher-income households have progressively gentrified lower-income working class suburbs.[45]

And yet such an occurrence is diametrically opposed to the findings of the area of Greater Dandenong, located approximately 35km from Melbourne CBD, that displayed both a dramatic increase in low and low-moderate income households (24% in 1986 to 40% in 2006) as well as a decrease in the proportion of high income households relative to the parent-city average.[46] Noting these figures, one may assume that prices of stock in both the rental and home-owner markets would decrease, and yet, they grew despite such income adjustments. And whilst the city of Greater Dandenong in relation to Boroondara represents the “sharpest degree of polarisation in Melbourne,”[47] it is by no means an anomaly. In virtue of the definition I have adopted all suburbs of disadvantage have a proportionally high percentage of low-income or unemployed citizens relative to the parent-city average. However, this does not explain AHURI’s findings that suggests:[48]

1. House prices of disadvantaged suburbs not only increased between 2001-2011 (alongside a decrease in income of households) but outpaced parent-city average percentages;

2. Entry rents in disadvantaged suburbs were comparable to city medians by 2011.

Unobjectionably, such findings quickly dispel common myths that suggest rent is lower within areas of disadvantage, and additionally, that rental prices decrease in spatial relation to Melbourne’s CBD. And yet, whilst AHURI suggest such obscure fluctuations may be an amalgamation of several causes, it is attractive to argue via deductive reasoning such findings are the result of basic market forces. For, if the number of properties in the private rental sector have increased relative to the amount of housing stock in an area, it would follow that rental investment within disadvantaged suburbs has increased. Furthermore, in viewing (1) and (2) together in a somewhat vicious cycle, one could argue investors over the period 2001-2011, were attracted to such areas due to initial lower capital costs that forecasted longer term increases in rental yields as well as higher capital gains relative to the parent-city average. Or in other words, by intensifying the competition at the lower end of the market, vacancy rates are effectively reduced, as tenants fear the availability of alternatives, and so therefore, landlords are able to increase rent over the course of occupation. To further compound this issue, although such line of inquiry sits outside the scope of this paper, I assume that in reference to housing stock within disadvantaged areas, that has been explicated to be both limited and relatively costly, low-to-medium income households would now be forced to compete for tenure against higher income households. If so, this would suggest that in treatment of housing as a commodity, investors are directly utilising margins of inequality as well as the despondence of the disadvantaged in order to generate wealth. Whilst such a conception is without a doubt unethical, I ask why are citizens of these suburbs accepting such conditions without moving to alternative areas offering more affordable rent comparative to income?

According to AHURI, income has a direct and positive relationship to population mobility, divided into in-movers and out-movers.[49] If we return to the comparison between Boroondara and Dandenong between 1986-2006, as examples of advantaged and disadvantaged suburbs respectively, we can identify the necessary link between income and mobility. In the example of Boroondara, the area experienced a disproportionate number of high-income in-movers than out-movers.[50] Comparatively, Dandenong’s in-movers have much lower household incomes than those moving out of the area. In fact, over this period, almost all high-moderate income households moved out of the region.[51] Wulff et al., (see: footnote) summarises Melbourne’s current mobility phenomenon as “either a rapid move toward socioeconomic advantage (Boroondara) or a rapid move toward socio-economic disadvantage (Dandenong).”[52] Not only are these patterns of mobility polarising the socio-spatial divisions of Melbourne, but are more importantly, compounding issues of low-income distribution in areas of disadvantage. And potentially, also creating the issue of ‘locking-in’ certain poorer households to geographical locations, restricted by a negative ability to move across the metropolitan region. And yet, so far within my argument I have assumed that socio-spatial divisions of Melbourne are an unwanted effect of the housing market. Is this necessarily true?

AHURI[53] suggests, for those citizens living within disadvantaged areas, such as Dandenong, the standard of living may be further compounded via ‘neighbourhood effects’ that suggest “living in a neighbourhood which is predominantly poor is itself a source of disadvantage.”[54] Further to this, Cass (see: footnotes) notes a positive correlation between the level of urban amenity and the price of housing that would suggest disadvantaged areas are prejudiced by governing bodies in relation to access to public services.[55]

Such hypotheses not only highlight concern for policy makers to be wary of spatially concentrated disadvantage, and the multiplying effects thereof, but potentially more importantly, display how diversity in both income and demography help to regulate the conditions of a given area. If understood correctly, such a notion would suggest that a disadvantaged household would have increased quality of life purely by relocating to a more mixed and diverse neighbourhood.[56] Yet, unfortunately, as we have already expounded, such households experience mobility constraints that prove false any opportunity of moving out of such neighbourhoods, and closer to either social or economic advantages, such as education or employment.

It is important to note within this argument however, that the location in itself is not the cause of the disadvantage but is instead generated via “market processes and government policies that deliver services, programs and economic benefits unevenly across metropolitan regions.”[57] Unfortunately, over and above such findings, it has been suggested the quality of housing stock, alongside these public provisions, is also disproportionate in relation not only to other metropolitan suburbs, but to the rental price associated.[58]

In fact, more material considerations such as physical dwelling structure play a determinate role in where particular family structures locate themselves in relation to the city, suggesting that price is not necessarily the only geographical sorting device. Research by AHURI confirms that within all disadvantaged suburbs of Melbourne not only do three and four-bedroom detached dwellings predominate, but as a percentage (76.2% in 2011) of dwelling type relative to the parent-city average, it appears that such suburbs offer domiciles designed for larger family structures.[59] In fact, the concentration of three-bedroom dwellings within disadvantaged areas even surpasses the that of one and two-bedroom dwellings across the entire metropolitan region.[60] Consequently, it would appear that low-income households are trading concerns of quality of stock, affordable rent and access to public services and infrastructure for an appropriate housing typology. Essentially, this suggests that market forces are pushing both minorities (or, émigrés) and nuclear families to the periphery of the greater city, subsequently ghettoising such associated areas.

The above discussion has been in effort to elucidate whether market forces, in virtue of their very nature, are responsible for the increase in inequality between socio-spatial neighbourhoods of a city. Whilst the intent of this paper was never to offer an alternative proposal, I hope that it serves as a gesture to how the agency of the housing market inherently produces geographical discrimination. Through utilising research by AHURI the spatial polarisation between the City of Boroondara and Greater Dandenong has been evidence to suggest that in the consolidation of uniform income brackets, disadvantaged areas become even worse off. Whilst it was outside the scope of this paper, during such analysis, it was suggested housing-as-shelter remains a concern for a large portion of individuals, and as such we should consider whether it should be treated as a commodity at all, especially in relation to how in the generation of wealth we are reliant upon the despondence of the lowest quintile of society. As if we continue to do so, it has been concluded, we risk further ghettoising areas of disadvantage.

[1] “Housing Support,” Department of Social Services, Australian Government, published October 2019, https://www.dss.gov.au/housing-support/programmes-services/housing

[2] “Australia’s National Human Rights Action Plan (1994),” Australian Human Rights Commission, published June 2013, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/australias-1st-national-human-rights-action-plan-1994

[3] Julian Lamont and Christi Favor, "Distributive Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/justice-distributive

[4] Ibid.

[5] I owe this understanding to Andrew Alexander.

[6]  “The Challenge of Housing the Nation,” Parliament of Australia, published October 2010, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook43p/housing

[7] Ibid.

[8] “Housing Support,” Department of Social Services, Australian Government, published October 2019, https://www.dss.gov.au/housing-support/programmes-services/housing

[9] Otfried Höffe and Joost den Haan, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Boston: Brill, 2013), 2.

[10] It is pertinent to note however, that Rawls himself never directly included housing as part of the BS.

[11] Höffe and den Haan, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 13.

[12] Ibid., 7.; Leif Wenar, "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls

[13] Höffe and den Haan, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 32.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Hereafter, every mention of quintile brackets is to be understood in relation to wealth.

[16] Leif Wenar "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls

[17] Anglicare Australia. Rental Affordability Snapshot 2016: Report by Anglicare Australia. (Canberra, 2016.), 11, https://www.anglicare.asn.au/docs/default-source/default-document-library/rental-affordability-snapshot-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=7

[18] Höffe and den Haan, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 32.

[19] “Affordable Housing Database,” OECD, published December 2016, https://www.oecd.org/social/affordable-housing-database.htm

[20] Acronym: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

[21] The average net value of owner-occupied housing held by the lowest quintile is roughly $2,000; (“Inequality in Australia 2018,” Australian Council of Social Service, published February 2019, https://www.acoss.org.au/inequality-in-australia-2018-html/)

[22] Ibid.

[23] Jahel Queralt, “The Place of the Market in a Rawlsian Economy” Analyse & Kritik, no. 1, 35 (2013): 127.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Lucy Groenhart, “Understanding the spatial impacts of direct and indirect government housing expenditure” Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited Final Report, no. 234 (November 2014), 1.

[26] Ibid.

[27] “Negative Gearing Changes ‘could tip Australia into recession’ warns John Symond,” ABC News, published December 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-12/housing-industry-insiders-issue-negative-gearing-warning/10602484

[28] Lucy Groenhart and Terry Burke, “Thirty years of public housing supply and consumption: 1981–2011” Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited Final Report, no. 231 (October 2014), 10.

[29] Anglicare Australia. Rental Affordability Snapshot 2016: Report by Anglicare Australia. (Canberra, 2016.), 11, https://www.anglicare.asn.au/docs/default-source/default-document-library/rental-affordability-snapshot-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=7

[30] “Affordable Housing Database,” OECD, published December 2016, https://www.oecd.org/social/affordable-housing-database.htm

[31] C. Maher, “Residential mobility, locational disadvantage and spatial inequality in Australian cities” Urban Policy and Research no. 3, 12 (1994): 187; B. Cass, “Reshaping Housing Policy and the Benefits of Urban/Regional Location: why Gender Matters,” Gender and Institutions: Welfare, Work and Citizenship (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 63.

[32] I owe this understanding again to Andrew Alexander.

[33] Wheeler, Karen, “Gimme Shelter: Toward Housing as a Right, Not a Commodity” Canadian Woman Studies/Les Cashiers De La Femme, 11 (1997): 64.

[34] “Inequality in Australia 2018”

[35] “Renting Laws are Changing: Safer and fairer laws for Victorian tenants and landlords,” Consumer Affairs Victoria, published June 2019, https://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/housing/renting/changes-to-renting-laws

[36] K. Hulse, H. Pawson, M. Reynolds and S. Herath, “Disadvantaged places in urban Australia: Analysing socioeconomic diversity and housing market performance” Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited Final Report, no. 225 (July 2014), 2.

[37] K. Hulse et al., “Disadvantaged places in urban Australia,” 17.

[38] Ibid., 4.

[39] As this figure has been collected as of 2006, I believe ex ante calculations would reveal this percentage to now be much greater; (Ibid.)

[40] K. Hulse et al., “Disadvantaged places in urban Australia,” 11.; Kath Hulse and Simon Pinnegar, “Housing markets and socio-spatial disadvantage: an Australian perspective” Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited, (January 2015), 7.

[41] Lucy Groenhart and Terry Burke, “Thirty years of public housing supply and consumption,” 10.

[42] K. Hulse et al., “Disadvantaged places in urban Australia,” 39.

[43] Due to the national First Home Owners Grant (FHOG) scheme introduced in July of 2000; (Lucy Groenhart, “Understanding the spatial impacts of direct and indirect government housing expenditure,” 1.)

[44] Maryann Wulff and Margaret Reynolds, “Housing, inequality and the role of population mobility.” Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited Final Report, no. 158 (November 2010), 20.

[45] Ibid., 23.

[46] Ibid., 24.

[47] Ibid., 25.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Maryann Wulff and Margaret Reynolds, “Housing, inequality and the role of population mobility,” 13.

[50] Ibid., 25.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Hulse et al., “Disadvantaged places in urban Australia,” 9.; Hulse and Pinnegar, “Housing markets and socio-spatial disadvantage: an Australian perspective,” 7.

[54] Hulse et al., “Disadvantaged places in urban Australia,” 9.

[55] Cass, “Reshaping Housing Policy,” 63.

[56] Hulse et al., “Disadvantaged places in urban Australia,” 9.

[57] Cass, “Reshaping Housing Policy,” 63.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Hulse et al., “Disadvantaged places in urban Australia,” 38.

[60] Ibid.