Kantian Moral Worth: The cheerful philanthropist, & self-interest

Within the present essay I will be discussing Kant’s famous passage within the Groundwork concerning a depressed philanthropist and the moral worth of his beneficence. I argue in agreement with Kant that actions involving amiability are not morally worthy.

The main contention within this passage is in the claim that only upon the philanthropist losing inclination to be charitable that his action “first has its genuine moral worth.”[1] Such an assertion prima facie immediately suggests that beneficent acts are not, all things considered, always moral. And yet, in our daily lives we seem to constantly praise acts of kindness and gratitude. However, importantly I do not believe that Kant here is suggesting the ‘cheerful’ philanthropist was immoral in his actions, but rather, that his action lacked moral content. And yet, how it is possible that the morality of the philanthropist’s act changed despite no change in the act itself? The only notable difference is that upon the agent falling depressed he no longer held an inclination towards giving. But he gives, nonetheless. Why? Kant suggests the depressed philanthropist was motivated “simply from duty.” [2] Thusly, the ‘goodness’, and ‘morally worthiness’ of an action does not lie externally in the act itself, nor upon the consequences of said act, but upon the motivation of the agent to act from duty. But, what of ‘duty’? In alignment with Baron’s interpretation of Kantian morality, I suggest ‘from duty’ not to be thought of as an unreflective and dogmatic adherence to what one has to do, but rather an acknowledgement of what one ought to do as morality requires.

And so, considering the philanthropist initially held a motivation to help others, this amiability, in Kant’s view, appears to have somewhat corrupted the morality of said act. In fact, for Kant, any alternative motivation (other than duty) distorts the goodwill of the agent, and thus the moral status of the forthcoming act. The philanthropist, when cheerful, was motivated to give out of “sympathy with the fate of others.”[3] We seem to assume in our everyday lives that if we are able to cultivate sympathy, thereby gaining a differing perspective about another individual or group of peoples, that our actions towards them would become more favourable. However, in agreement with Kant, I do not believe that the motive of sympathy, as well as many other pro-social emotions are as virtuous or ‘good’ as we grant them. We know that the philanthropist was initially moved by, was amiable with, and subsequently sympathetic toward the distress of a group of people. He also had the means to benefit these people. Surely then, the philanthropist in giving to these people relished the outcome that saw a relief in their troubles. And furthermore, experienced some form of happiness in virtue of being motivated from amiability; to say otherwise would be absurd. Therefore, the cheerful philanthropist also gained, and potentially more than an enjoyment in the peoples’ fortune. He may have also gained by contrasting his life with those less fortune, focusing on their suffering in stead of his own. Possibly he also enjoyed the reputation that came with, bragging to his friends about his charity work.

Additionally, in considering the beneficiaries, how did the philanthropist decide on the particular individual or group deserved of his aid? During the time he was motivated by feelings of amiability toward ‘a’, there very much could have been a greater cause or group ‘b’, more in need of his support that would not receive such as they did not hold a social relation with the philanthropist. Moreover still, in his amiability towards the beneficiaries, their distress itself would become quite personal for the agent, and thus, the ‘distress’ potentially exaggerated. What if you were to learn the philanthropist’s beneficence was directed towards out-of-work billionaires? If this were the case, surely you would agree with me, and in alignment with Kant, that this act, whilst somewhat admirable and in accordance with duty, “deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem.”[4] Consequently, I argue, similar to Kant, that the actions of the philanthropist are only morally worthy once he no longer holds amiability towards the beneficiaries as it is only then that he is not acting in a self-interested, morally-nepotistic manner.

For, if amiability has a role in motivating moral acts, surely it would also motivate immoral acts. Recent social movements such as #MeToo and BlackLivesMatter has very much called attention to the ‘go-along-with’ herd mentality of friendship groups in concealing the immoral acts of those who have close relations to us. And yet, the apparent consequence of this view, which suggests an action has moral worth only if performed via a sort of ‘disinterest’ has been highly criticised. Stocker would claim in objection to Kant, that in the case of visiting a friend in hospital, it would not be morally praiseworthy if the agent did so because it was the ‘right thing to do’ and not out of care and concern for their friend. Further objections levelled by Schiller, in a mockery of Kant suggests moral agents should aim to feel hatred towards friends so to render their actions towards them morally worthy. On the objection by Stocker, I suggest the example does not display a moral quandary but rather just a decision of preference. If there were extra content to make it worthy of moral debate however, much like the cheerful philanthropist, I would suggest this agent is again motivated by self-interest. Afterall, even if we afforded morality to the act of the agent visiting his friend from a motivation of concern, this concern is in no means ‘selfless;’ the agent’s vested interest in the health and wellbeing of their friend is inseparable from their self-interests of happiness. Ipso, facto, not morally worthy. In response to Schiller, I do not believe that the contention of Kant’s claims has been appropriately reconceptualised. For, if my understanding is correct, the agent still desires to favour his friendship group. However, does it follow, that we never act morally worthy if our action is directed towards those whom we are amiable with?

Kant’s critics would claim his account of morality reveals not only a deficiency in his understanding of affections but renders the system also only relevant to issues between strangers. However, I believe this to be an unfortunate misreading of Kant. What is crucial in his distinction from the cheerful to depressed philanthropist is that in the latter act the agent treats duty as a sufficient reason to act.

[1] Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”, in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, eds by Russ Schafer-Landau (Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 487.; emphasis added

[2] Ibid., emphasis added

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.