Mill’s Quality of Happiness: Is the delineation of ‘low’ & ‘high’ useful?
Within Hedonism, Mill argues that within the utilitarian doctrine, in which morally right action is positioned as the action that produces the most utility (good), the concept of utility ought to be considered in relation to the Greatest Happiness Principle. Or rather, in Mill’s own words, “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness.”[1] And moreover, “By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain.”[2] In this essay I will argue that in the delineation of ‘low’ and ‘high’ pleasures and the introduction of quality, in addition to quantity of such, Mill runs into three main issues, the impossibility of interpersonal utility calculations, the issue of conservative bias and lastly, the issue of contingency and exposure to experience, subsequently doing more harm than use for his hedonistic doctrine. Firstly, prior to analysing Mill’s moral hedonism and the issues therein, I believe it pertinent to address why it was necessary for Mill to find the need for such a distinction.
According to Mill, pleasure is the only thing pursued by humans as an end, with all other goods, pursued only in relation to being desirable as a means towards pleasure.[3] However, of course, such a stance becomes clearly open to the objection that if morality is grounded upon “pleasure, and freedom from pain”[4] what is to save us from becoming say, a happiness monster?, who, in path to happiness, is able to justify pain towards others. It goes without saying, such a creature intuitively appears quite immoral. Further conceptions position this monster as an “experience machine”; an “indeterminate blob”[5] fed pleasure stimulation, in a larger thesis by Robert Nozick that asked, as humans, is it really just the sensation of pleasure we desire as an end, or the real experience thereof? However, such a question, albeit contemporary in content[6], appears somewhat similar to the swine objection levelled against Epicureanism, which rejected the doctrine on the basis of likening human objections to that of a pig.
In fact, Mill decidedly prefaced his positive moral thesis within Hedonism by stating his response to such objections. His response, of which I will later argue seems somewhat contra to the core of his thesis, in trying to reason that human pleasures differ from those of an animal, and thus rendering it unreasonable and ‘degrading’ in suggestion that humans would degrade into happiness monsters, he introduces the parameter of quality in relation to pleasure.
Mill argues that a utilitarian should not only take into account quantity of pleasure, but also quality of pleasure. He suggests, that if indeed it were true that the pleasures of humans and animals were equal, humans would indubitably swap their life for that of an animal, if of course, it were to increase their pleasure. And yet, as Mill suggests, and on this I tend to agree with him, it is “better to be a human being dissatisfied, than a pig satisfied.”[7] As a result of such facts, albeit brazenly generalised in nature, Mill concludes it is clear humans have a preference for ‘existence with higher pleasures.’[8] And furthermore, that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.”[9] Ipso facto, pleasures can be categorised as either ‘low’ or ‘high’ in quality.
The question remains however, how is one to qualify a high or low pleasure? Surely, considering the hedonistic nature of Mill’s utilitarianism, this enquiry seems only possible in privation? Afterall, he is equating utility in reference to a state of mind (pleasure or pain). It would follow then, that I must be able to differentiate between my own low and high pleasures. In other words, what is a high-quality pleasure? At first it would appear Mill offers us an answer, suggesting amongst the higher pleasures “of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments.”[10] However again, this offers us little distinction. Only upon a comparison to a man pursuing “sensual indulgences to the injury of health”[11] does a structure behind these categories begin to emerge. Mill states, “Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference (…) that is the more desirable pleasure.”[12] As such, it would follow that the categorisation of a higher pleasure is a public and collective affair.
However, I argue that in the formulation of high and low categories of pleasures in response to The Utilitarian Swine Objection, he has subsequently created issues for his own Hedonistic theory, of which I believe there to be three main interrelated predicaments.[13] Firstly, as suggested earlier, grounding a moral theory upon subjective states-of-mind consequently produces an issue with the calculating of such interpersonal data. As Goodin would say, “every mind is inscrutable to every other mind.”[14] If, according to Mill we are to calculate pleasure, which, in having higher value one would assume as more worthy of our pursuit than those of lower pleasure, as of high quality, we do so in virtue of others categorising it similarly. And yet, as Goodin highlights, how are we to know the value of pleasure someone else derives from ‘something’? Not only would this assume firstly, that one is able to make a comparison of pleasure across goods, but that furthermore, we can then compare this data in relation to others’ hedonistic relation with goods. Utilising Goodin’s example, within calculations of sensory pleasures, we can quickly see how one could conclude that a broken arm is clearly worse than a pinprick, and hence should be avoided. In Goodin’s words, “everyone can compare (…) the utility that they derive from apples versus oranges.”[15] However, there exists no Archimedean Point upon which we can compare the broken arm of someone to the pinprick of another; pleasures and pains are by nature, idiosyncratic. Or furthermore, beyond bodily sensations, how a job loss could compare to a divorce? And impossible still, how to weigh a job loss of someone against the divorce of another? This is what objectors refer to as the “impossibility of interpersonal utility calculations.”[16]
Such an objection also seems to trace the boundaries of objections aimed against general utilitarianism that suggests such a theory is too demanding in practice.
Stronger still, I do not believe there is enough clarification by Mill within either Hedonism or Utilitarianism in establishing how the nuances of such comparisons are ever possible in refute of the above issue.
Secondly, I believe via the distinction of high and low pleasures, a “deeply conservative bias into our decision rule”[17] is created. If high pleasures are categorised as such only in virtue of unanimity, our morality becomes anchored by mere consensus. But more importantly, difference would become neglected in favour of majority. And, in my conception of the field is to be believed, is not the purpose of morality inquiry to challenge the majority? To suggest that human beings gravitate towards high pleasure is one thing, but for this to be the foundation of morality, is something completely separate. I will now return to a previous passage and Goodin’s example, the comparison of the pinprick and broken arm. It is quite intuitive to suggest that it is wrong action to break someone’s arm. However, what is the moral delineation between low and high quantities of pleasure and pain? Would it be morally wrong to pinprick someone? I ask, because when considering aggregation as the foundation to morality it very much matters if ‘low’ quantity has differing moral weight. I suggest that it was not long ago that consensus would have suggested the pleasure derived from the perpetrators of sexual harassment within workplaces was of ‘higher’ quality than the pain of the victims of such acts. Afterall, would not these victims have less consensus review of their pleasure or pain. Furthermore, why must a consensus matter to the value of the pleasure or pain at all. Ought we not to have a stronger and more stable structure to our morality than a consensus in a certain space and time? Whilst this example is bleak, it has revealed, as has history revealed, within certain events themselves but also the general concept in toto, that majority and morality are not necessarily related. Furthermore, as is suggested in Goodin’s above quote, anchoring morality in consensus first establishes a need for consensus, which as we know, brings with it the first issue discussed in this essay, and secondly, establishes a limitation on the growth of a society’s moral system. Marginalised pleasures and pains, of which, I indubitably suggest would have a correlation to other socio-political inequalities such as race and gender, would surely be rendered ‘low,’ and as thus go against the supposed ‘egalitarian’ nature of the doctrine. Moral progress would be slow.
Thirdly, in a somewhat follow-on from my second issue, I suggest that in Mill’s distinction of ‘low’ and ‘high’ pleasure the issue of contingency arises. If at first, one is to preform their own private comparisons of ‘low’ and ‘high’ pleasures, it would follow that the result is surely in virtue of experience, with the cause of such states-of-mind. Indeed, Mill seems to concede this point stating, “and the society into which it has thrown them.”[18] And furthermore, “capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant.”[19] Whilst taking out of context I know; these propositions seem to suggest that Mill acknowledges the contingent nature of qualifying higher pleasures. This is, of course if we read ‘nobler feelings’ to insinuate those of high quality. To expand on this point more, let me return to the comparison of a job loss to a divorce. Is not the pain and quality felt thereof in relation to someone’s job loss contingent not only upon the quality of pain they have ever felt before, but also, whether or not they had lost a job prior, whether they were financially secure and whether they had a support network of family and friends, or not? And, are not similar contingent factors also relevant to a divorce? And that particular someone.
To show another correlation of these three factors, I readdress my issue of the moral weight assigned to ‘low’ and ‘high’ pleasures. If my assumption is correct that ‘higher’ pleasures have more moral weight[20], which also align with consensus views, it would follow that marginalised pains and pleasures do not even receive a seat at the table of moral inquiry. As such, not only is the privation of pleasure and pain a factor in the impossibility of interpersonal utility calculations but so too is the notion of consensus itself. So, I offer a rejoinder for Mill against my own issues with the how the qualification of low and high pleasures is conceived in the only way I imagine the distinction as ‘useful’. I suggest, that instead of differentiating value based on consensus, it ought to be based on time. Within Mill’s textual comparisons of qualities exists already a relation of time, as in the comparison of sensual pleasures now and future long-term health concerns. Furthermore, within the utilitarian doctrine, time is not a new concept; the notion of ‘diminishing marginal utility’[21] offering a suggestion to why goods yield lower pleasure over time. Whilst this conception notes the relation of time and quality as a moment-by-moment data output, taken from a backward-looking perspective, I suggest there is also a presence of a forward-looking relation of time and quality of pleasure. And, it is both backward-looking and forward-looking perspective on pleasure and pain that are essential to our categorization of such. Afterall, utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory, which in-itself is forward-looking. In our categorization of quality of pain and pleasure, and in addressing the notion of ‘how one ought to live’ surely, we are cognizant of potential pain and pleasure within our calculations of ‘quality.’ However, such a rejoinder sounds more welfarist in nature than hedonistic, in the abstraction from felt pleasure and pain to imagined ‘best interest.’ Yet whilst it is clear such an idea needs much further analysis, I bring it up to purely in the suggestion that there is potential avenues in Mill’s delineation of ‘low’ and ‘high’ pleasures that move beyond mere association with aggregates.
In summary, whilst Mill does well to rebuff Swine Objections to hedonistic utilitarianism, in distinction of quality of pleasure as ‘high’ or ‘low’ based on aggregate opinion, he introduces further objections such as those mentioned previously, the impossibility of interpersonal utility calculations, the issue of conservative bias and lastly, the issue of contingency and exposure to experience. As a potential rejoinder I offered a rereading of ‘low’ and ‘high’ values of pleasure and pain in relation to a forward-looking perspective on time. However, such an experiment was merely to illustrate in the delineation of quality of pleasure, Mill’s mistake was not in the categorisation of ‘low’ and ‘high’ but rather his anchoring of such to a majority. Subsequently, doing little to also position his propositions of human nature, as intrinsically hedonistic, as the foundation of his morality.
[1] John Stuart Mill, “Hedonism”, in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, eds. Russ Schafer-Landau, (Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 258.
[2] John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism”, in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, eds. Russ Schafer-Landau, (Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
[3] Or, of course, freedom from pain.
[4] Mill, “Hedonism”, 258.
[5] Robert Nozick, “The Experience Machine”, in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, eds. Russ Schafer-Landau, (Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 264.
[6] Of similarity in the suggestion that the experience machine is pre-programmed towards only desirable experiences
[7] Mill, “Hedonism”, 259.
[8] Whilst, personally, I believe this merely shows we pursue something other than pleasure.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., 258.
[11] Ibid., 260.
[12] Ibid., 259.
[13] Of which I largely owe to the writings of Robert E. Goodin.
[14] Robert Goodin, “Utility and the Good”, in A Companion to Ethics, eds. Peter Singer, (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: Blackwell Reference, 1993), 245.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., 246.
[18] Mill, “Hedonism”, 260.
[19] Ibid.
[20] I cannot understand the relevance of delineating between the two categories if this is not the case, as otherwise it reads as an empty rejoinder.
[21] Goodin, “Utility and the Good”, 247.